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ARTICLE
CAN A MERCHANT PLEASE GOD?: THE CHURCH'S
HISTORIC TEACHING ON THE GOODNESS OF JUST
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY AS A FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF COMMERCIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
Rodney D. Chrisman'
I. INTRODUCTION

Can a merchant please God? To modern readers that question
undoubtedly seems unusual. Perhaps some are offended by such a question,
feeling that it is intolerant and should not even be asked in public
discourse.' Others might view it as an example of a quaint concern from a
bygone era when God was believed to exist and therefore His opinion of
things seemed quite important. Persons holding to this view might well
consider this question to be entirely irrelevant.2 Perhaps others still view a
t Associate Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. B.B.A. 1998, Eastern
Kentucky University; J.D. 2001, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author would
like to thank Dean Jeffrey C. Tuomala for patiently sharing his insights into the Christian
worldview of law during countless discussions in the faculty suite, the opportunity to teach at
the law-school level for the first time in Lawyering Skills IV in the spring of 2006, and the
opportunity teach Legal History in the spring of 2010-all of which can rightly be described
as life-changing. Further, the author would like to thank Jason J. Heinen and Daniel J.
Schmid for their invaluable research assistance. The author would also like to thank his wife,
Heather, who has done the author only "good, and not evil, [a]ll the days of her life" and in
whom "[t]he heart of her husband trusts" above all others. Proverbs 31:11-12. Finally, the
author would like to thank Jesus Christ-the Lord of the Church, the merchant, and all
things.
1. Such people would likely see theology, or perhaps the preferred term now is
spirituality, as a purely private matter that has no part in the public discourse. While to many
this may seem natural and the way things have always been, it is, in fact, a very recent and
unfortunate development. Of this development, Professor Berman writes that
the significant factor in this regard-in the nineteenth century and even more
in the twentieth-was the very gradual reduction of traditional religion to the
level of a personal, private matter, without public influence on legal
development, while other belief systems-new secular religions (ideologies,
"isms")-were raised to the level of passionate faiths for which people
collectively were willing not only to die but also to live new lives.
HAROLD

J.

BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL

TRADITION 31 (1983).
2. There is likely a range of opinions in this group. Some would say it is irrelevant to
them, but it could be relevant for an individual who views such things as important in his
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question like this as very important for their personal lives as they desire to
please God with all they do.3 These persons could be said to view this
question, and others like it, to be of great spiritual importance. However,
very few people indeed would imagine that such a question might be of
grave legal importance, in addition to any spiritual significance it might
have.
Yet, the issue of whether a merchant can please God was one of
paramount importance to jurists and theologians, not to mention
own private life. Oftentimes, they would also consider it to be entirely irrelevant and even
inappropriate to ask such a question in the public square or to make it a part of a policy
consideration. Some in this category view any kind of religious thought, such as this, as a
mere crutch for those who need such things to deal with life. This author was at one point an
atheist, and he, at that time, viewed religion in this manner.
Finally, there are others, such as Christopher Hitchens (recently deceased), Richard
Dawkins, and others among the so-called "new atheists," who are much more militant to
such views. These men view the belief in God as something that is positively dangerous for
society. Therefore, they would likely label the question "can a merchant please God?" as one
that is destructive even to consider. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT:
How RELIGION POISONs EVERYTHING (2007) ("The human invention of god is the problem to
begin with."); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 348 (2006) ("Faith can be very very
dangerous, and deliberately to implant it into the vulnerable mind of an innocent child is a
grievous wrong.").
3. Modern evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and others would fall within this
category. As a conservative evangelical, this author would fall into this category as he hopes
to do everything that he does for the glory of God, and he does believe that God exists and
finds His opinion to be the most important one in the universe.
The Westminster Shorter Catechism would reflect this view in its very first question,
which asks, "What is the chief end of man?" The answer given is that "[mian's chief end is to
glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever [sic]." Westminster Assembly, The Westminster
Shorter Catechism, in WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH 287 (Free Presbyterian
Publications 1994) (1646). Further, the biblical support for this position is voluminous. See,
e.g., 1 Corinthians10:31 ("Whether, then, you eat or drink or whatever you do, do all to the
glory of God.") (New American Standard Bible: Updated Edition (hereinafter all Scripture
quotations are taken from the New American Standard Bible: Updated Edition, unless
otherwise specifically noted)); Colossians 3:23-24 ("Whatever you do, do your work heartily,
as for the Lord rather than for men, knowing that from the Lord you will receive the reward
of the inheritance. It is the Lord Christ whom you serve.").
4. The author also falls into this small minority of people who believe that the
teachings of the Bible are highly relevant for all of life, including any legal system. While this
represents a minority view now, it was once assumed across virtually all of Western
Civilization. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 1, at 115 ("All these laws were considered to be
subordinate to the precepts contained in the Bible (both the Old and New Testaments) and
in the writings of the early church fathers .. .. "); STEPHEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 45-48
(2004); see generally,Stuart Banner, When Christianitywas Partof the Common Law, 16 LAW
& HIST. REv. 27 (1998).
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merchants, during the high middle ages. This question was central to the
consideration of commercial law during the period when the Western legal
tradition, Western commercial law, and the institutions therein, were being
formed.' The answer to this theological question impacted the development
of the Law Merchant and therefore ultimately still impacts Western
commercial law to this day.' Accordingly, this Article considers how the
answer to this question was resolved during that time and suggests that
perhaps this understanding could form the foundation for understanding
the jurisprudence of commercial law today.
If so, this would be a welcome development for there is much confusion
as to the purpose, concept, or jurisprudence of commercial law.' A few
5. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 336-39 (addressing the issue of commercial law and
theology in particular, and the book as a whole discusses the formation of the Western legal
tradition). This book won the 1984 SCRIBES Book Award awarded by the American Bar
Association for the best new book on a legal subject. Professor Berman had a long and
distinguished career as a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Emory University
School of Law.
In this excellent work, Professor Berman persuasively argues that the Western legal
tradition was formed during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Professor Berman refers to
this period, which is often referred to as the Gregorian Reforms under Pope Gregory VII, as
"the Papal Revolution of 1075-1122." Id. at 19. He uses the word "revolution ... to refer
to... epoch-making periods" such as the Protestant Reformation and the American and
French Revolutions. Id. at 19-20. His study details the immense changes in the religious,
educational, societal, economic, and legal systems of Western Europe during this period that
led to the formation of the Western legal tradition. One of those changes was a shift in the
church's attitude toward merchants and commercial activity, which serves as the topic of this
article. The author is persuaded by Professor Berman's work, and therefore, this work
proceeds under the assumption that the Western legal tradition was formed during the Papal
Revolution, and the term "Papal Revolution" is therefore borrowed and used herein to refer
to this period for the sake of convenience. If the reader takes issue with this conclusion
regarding the formation of the Western legal tradition, the author would respectfully direct
him to Professor Berman's work. To set forth fully those arguments is well beyond the scope
of this Article.
6. This Article does not take the position that modern commercial law, and its primary
manifestation in the United States of America-the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")-is
the modern law merchant. That is a matter open to scholarly debate and discussion. See, e.g.,
Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Contract: The Unform Commercial Code as Law Merchant,
27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 91 (1991). Rather, this Article merely makes the rather unremarkable and
hopefully uncontroversial assumption that the UCC has in its lineage an ancestor known as
the Law Merchant and that an understanding of the Law Merchant might help in
understanding its descendants-Western commercial law in general and perhaps the UCC in
particular.
7. Professor Steven D. Smith suggests that confusion reigning in the law as a whole
today comes from the abandonment of what he describes as the classical approach to law,
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scholars have attempted to address this confusion. For example, in an
article in 1978, Professor Hal Scott lamented that "[t]here is no real
jurisprudence of commercial law. We are presently prisoners of the
conception that commercial law embodies the law merchant and that the
Uniform Commercial Code merely furnishes businessmen with a clear
statement of their rules."' In that article, Professor Scott asserts that
commercial law should not be understood as deriving from the law
merchant or merely as providing a clear set of rules for businessmen.9
Rather, he asserts that "commercial law rules are instead to be understood
as largely regulatory in import."'o What this regulatory regime is primarily
concerned with, according to Professor Scott, is the allocation of risk among
the transacting parties."
In a 2009 article, Professor John Linarelli quotes, apparently with
agreement and approval, Professor Scott's lament regarding the lack of a
coherent jurisprudence explaining the conception of commercial law. 2
However, he does not appear to share Professor Scott's conclusion that
commercial law is concerned merely with risk allocation." "Legal scholars
have relinquished the task of 'jurisprudential' thought about commercial
law to law and economics,"" he writes." Rejecting the idea "that economics

which was very much based upon Christianity and the God of the Bible. See SMITH, supra
note 4, at45-51, 151-53, 155-57,174-75 (2004).
8. Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L.REV. 737,737 (1978).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 738.
11. Id. at 737.
12. John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudenceand the Concept of Commercial Law, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 119, 120 (2009).
13. Id. at 213-14.
14. Id. at 128. This is an important and interesting statement given the dominance of
law and economics as a jurisprudential system. In the preface to his immensely popular and
influential "textbook-treatise" on law and economics entitled ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
Judge Richard A. Posner asserts that law and economics "is the foremost interdisciplinary
field of legal studies." RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW xxi (8th ed. 2010). In
support of this statement, he writes:
The former dean of the Yale Law School, a critic of the law and economics
movement, nevertheless has called it "an enormous enlivening force in
American legal thought" and says that it "continues and remains the single
most influential jurisprudential school in this country." More recently we read
that "there is no dispute that law and economics has long been, and continues
to be, the dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding and assessing law
and policy."
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is almost all there is to commercial law," he states that "[olne of the major
gaps in the philosophy of law canon is the near total absence of a
philosophical account for commercial law."" His "article aim[ed] to fill that
gap"" by "us[ing] conceptual analysis to articulate a cosmopolitan
conception of legal positivism and to develop it into a concept of
commercial law as a transnational normative order." 8
Apparently Professor Scott's erudite article was not able to dispel the
mystery surrounding the conception and purpose of commercial law, at
least in the eyes of Professor Linarelli, given that Professor Linarelli's article
is still struggling with the issue some twenty-one years later. Whether
Professor Linarelli's article will be any more successful on this front only
time will tell. However, recognizing the risks of prognostication, this author
does not believe that Professor Linarelli's learned article will succeed where
Professor Scott's has apparently failed.
This predication derives not from a low view of Prof Scott, Professor
Linarelli, or the other scholars who have attempted to clarify the
jurisprudence of commercial law. Rather, it stems from the author's
conviction that the conception and purpose of commercial law is so baffling
to modern scholars because its historical jurisprudential roots have become
obscured by virtue of being primarily theological. In the intervening
centuries since the formation of the Western legal tradition in general and
the birth of commercial law within that tradition in particular, Western
civilization has forgotten or rejected the theology that served as the
foundation for its law in general and its commercial law in particular.
Without a proper understanding of commercial law's historically
theological roots, it does appear that commercial law, and indeed much of
the rest of Western law, lacks any satisfactory conceptual explanation.
In his excellent book Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western
Legal Tradition, Professor Harold J. Berman discusses this development in
the Western legal tradition that has so obscured the jurisprudential
foundations of not just commercial law but nearly all of Western law.

Id. (quoting Anthony T. Kronman, Remarks at the Second DrikerForumfor Excellence in the
Law, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 115, 160 (1995)). Professor Linarelli offers a form of modified
positivism as an alternative to a law and economics approach.
15. Professor Smith seems to agree regarding the dominance of law and economics. He
writes, "the law and economics movement [is] perhaps the most influential development in
legal thought in the second half of the century."See SMITH, supra note 4, at 78.
16. Linarelli, supra note 12, at 128.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 213.
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[The] basic institutions, concepts, and values of Western legal
systems have their sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and
doctrines of the eleventh and twelfth centuries . . . Over the

intervening centuries, these religious attitudes and assumptions
have changed fundamentally, and today [in 1983] their
theological sources seem to be in the process of drying up. Yet
the legal institutions, concepts, and values that have derived from
them still survive, often unchanged. Western legal science is a
secular theology, which often makes no sense because its
theologicalpresuppositionsare no longer accepted.
[T]he legal systems of all Western countries, and of all nonWestern countries that have come under the influence of
Western law, are a secular residue of religious attitudes and
assumptions which historically found expression first in liturgy
and rituals and doctrine of the church and thereafter in
institutions and concepts and values of the law. When these
historical roots are not understood, many parts of the law appear
to lack any underlyingsource of validity."
Commercial law, accordingly, appears to "make[] no sense" and "lack any
underlying source of validity" because "its theological presuppositions are
no longer accepted" or even understood.
Professor Steven D. Smith has also written on this confusion that
pervades jurisprudence in the modern legal community in his excellent
book entitled Law's Quandary.20 Beyond a discussion on commercial law
jurisprudence, Professor Smith exposes how all modern jurisprudential
schools are operating in ontological gaps, i.e., their generally accepted
ontological inventories are insufficient to guide, explain, or justify their
views of the law.2 ' Modern jurisprudence lacks the foundation that the
"classical approach" had in abundance and all as a result of the worldview
with which the legal scholars and theologians prior to the modern era
approached law.2 2 "Blackstone and Story were, after all, heirs of a worldview
that assumed that God was real-more real than anything else, in fact, or
necessarily rather than just contingently real-and had created the universe
according to a providential plan.""
19. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 165-66 (emphasis added).
20. See SMITH, supra note 4.

21. Id. at 5-37, 157, 175.
22. Id. at 45-48.
23. Id. at 46.
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Indeed, as Professors Berman and Smith aptly point out, not only are the
theological foundations of the law, to use Professor Berman's phraseology,
or the classical approach to the law to use Professor Smith's, no longer
accepted nor understood, they are no longer even considered as a proper
knowledge base from which to draw in developing, critiquing, or
understanding the law. In our post-modern world, "for the first time,
religion has become largely a private affair, while law has become largely a
matter of practical expediency."24 This hearkens back to Professor Scott's
lament that commercial law often appears as little more than a set of rules
according to which businessmen may govern their affairs. The bankruptcy
of such a view of law is obvious, and it is not surprising therefore that it
does not inspire confidence or lend itself to a consistent jurisprudence.
In fact, Professor Berman notes that these changes in the way that not
just commercial law but all of law is viewed have led to a crisis of confidence
in the law. He writes that "[allmost all the nations of the West are
threatened today by a cynicism about law, leading to a contempt for law."25
Further, the alternatives offered are not up to the task of dispelling the
current cynicism because they do not provide a view of the law that is
consistent, comprehensive, and that corresponds to reality.26 The only
jurisprudential system that can possibly offer a consistent, comprehensive,
and corresponding view of the law is the "classical approach," or, as Dean
Jeff Tuomala calls it, "law of nature" jurisprudence.27

24. BERMAN,

supra note 1, at vi.

25. Id. at 40.

26. Berman stated that
Cynicism about the law, and lawlessness, will not be overcome by adhering to a
so-called realism which denies the autonomy, the integrity, and the
ongoingness of our legal tradition. In the words of Edmund Burke, those who
do not look backward to their ancestry will not look forward to their posterity.
Id. at 41. Further, as Professor Smith demonstrates, the various modern jurisprudential
alternatives are not able to rescue law from that charge that it does not make sense. SMITH,
supra note 4, at 65-96.
27. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 4, at 151-53, where Professor Smith notes that the
classical approach might be able to rescue us from our current "quandary," but then laments
that
[w]e are by now far removed, of course, from times in which such an account
could be presented openly and discussed respectfully. For many of us, the
classical account is a distant memory; for others it is not even that. So perhaps
all we can confidently say is that the classical account, if it were admissible and
believable, might be of some help.
Id. at 151-52.
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Unfortunately, as Professors Berman and Smith point out, this view of
the law is generally considered to be an inappropriate basis for public
discourse or academic argumentation. Professor Berman laments that
religion has been relegated to a purely private role, and Professor Smith
notes that the religious ontology, though possibly able to rescue the law
from its present quandary, is intellectually unacceptable due to "[t]he takenfor-granted 'fact' of [inevitable] secularization."2 8 Professor Smith notes that
the clear result of this "inevitable secularization" has been
that academics have internalized a norm prescribing that
religious beliefs are inadmissible in academic explanations.
Historians may believe in God, but they do not explain historical
events by reference to the workings of God in history (as was
once common). Scientists may be religious believers, and they
may even argue that science provides support for religious belief,
but they typically do not resort to religious explanations for
specific natural phenomena in the way that even "Enlightened"
thinkers like Jefferson once did. With respect to the legal
academy, Laycock himself draws this conclusion: "One inference
is that the believers feel obliged to be quiet about [their beliefs]"
in an academic context."
This article endeavors to violate this norm by looking to the classical
approach to law in order to begin to develop a consistent, comprehensive,
and corresponding view of commercial law.
That said, a fully developed and thorough-going jurisprudence of
commercial law is beyond this single work. Instead, the goal of this article is
to take a look at the historical theological developments surrounding the
birth of commercial law within the Western legal tradition. By considering
the theological issues that surrounded commercial law at this formulatory
state of the Western legal tradition, it is hoped that a better view of the
overarching purpose of commercial law can be seen. Such a purpose, while
not establishing a thorough-going jurisprudence of commercial law, has
promise to prove most helpful in the goal of beginning to develop one. In
order to accomplish this goal, this article employs the classical approach to
law. In order to do that, it considers the church's historic answer to the
question with which this paper began-"can a merchant please God?"

28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 36 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
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II. CAN A MERCHANT PLEASE GOD?: THE CHURCH'S TEACHINGS
PRIOR TO THE PAPAL REVOLUTION

"Can a merchant please God?" This question had enormous spiritual
implications for the people of Western Christendom in the medieval period.
The people of the middle ages were consumed with the question that the
Philippian jailor asked Paul and Silas, "What must I do to be saved?""o Hell
and purgatory seemed very real in those days, and the'issue of how to avoid
the eternal punishment of God was on the order of first importance in
nearly everyone's mind. Thus, it was critically important to a merchant, and
indeed the jurists and theologians, of the time to answer the question
whether a merchant can ever be pleasing to God.
Further, the medieval period knew nothing of the modern idea of the
separation of church and state," which to most modern elites means
something more along the lines of the "separation of religion and state.""
Rather, in the medieval period, when the Western legal tradition was born,
and indeed throughout most of its history, there has existed an integral
30. This question arose from an incident in what is commonly referred to as Paul's
second missionary journey. Paul and Silas were ministering in Philippi in Macedonia. Paul
cast a demonic spirit out of a slave girl whose masters had been profiting from the spirit's
purported ability to tell the future through the girl. Upon seeing that they could no longer
profit in this way, her masters stirred up the crowd against Paul and Silas. See Acts 16:11-21.
Luke writes:
The crowd rose up together against them, and the chief magistrates tore their
robes off them and proceeded to order them to be beaten with rods. When they
had struck them with many blows, they threw them into prison, commanding
the jailer to guard them securely; and he, having received such a command,
threw them into the inner prison and fastened their feet in the stocks.
But about midnight Paul and Silas were praying and singing hymns of praise
to God, and the prisoners were listening to them; and suddenly there came a
great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison house were shaken; and
immediately all the doors were opened and everyone's chains were unfastened.
When the jailer awoke and saw the prison doors opened, he drew his sword and
was about to kill himself, supposing that the prisoners had escaped. But Paul
cried out with a loud voice, saying, "Do not harm yourself, for we are all here!"
And he called for lights and rushed in, and trembling with fear he fell down
before Paul and Silas, and after he brought them out, he said, "Sirs, what must I
do to be saved?"
Acts 16:22-30. Paul and Silas answered, "'Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will saved, you
and your household.'" Acts 16:3 1.
31. Such a separation is, in fact, not possible. The myth of a neutral, secular arena where
religions (or worldviews) do not matter is just that-a myth. However, that myth has been
used very shrewdly in our time to silence all arguments in the public square that are based
upon religious conviction.
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connection between law and theology, religion and state. Indeed, during
this time, law developed under the influence of theology." Most relevant to
this paper, Professor Berman asserts that the Law Merchant, 3 which had its
origins during the time of the Papal Revolution, developed under the
influence of the church's teachings on commercial transactions. He writes:
From the point of view of the Christian social theory which
prevailed in the formative period of Western commercial
institutions, the economic activities of merchants, like other
secular activities, were no longer to be considered as necessarily
"a danger to salvation"; on the contrary, they were considered to
be a path to salvation, if carried on according to the principles
laid down by the church. These principles were spelled out in the
canon law. From the church's point of view, the law developed
by the merchants to regulate their own interrelationships, the lex
mercatoria, was supposed to reflect, not contradict, the canon
law. The merchants did not always agree with that. They did not
disagree,however, that the salvation of their souls depended on the
conformity of theirpractices to a system of law based on the will of
God as manifested in reason and conscience.
Thus the social and economic activity of merchants was not
left outside the reach of moral issues. A social and economic
morality was developed which purported to guide the souls of
merchants toward salvation. And that morality was embodied in
law. Law was a bridge between mercantile activity and the
salvation of the soul."
Thus, according to Professor Berman, the Law Merchant, the ancestor to
modern commercial law, developed in light of the church's teachings on
commercial activity during a time in which the worldview of Western
Civilization was undeniably Christian. As stated, the law governing
merchants and commercial activity was designed as a guide to salvation.
The Law Merchant helped to answer, in large part, the burning question in
the mind of the merchant-"what must I do to be saved?" "Law was a
35
bridge between mercantile activity and the salvation of the soul."
32. And, at times, theology developed under the influence of the law.
33. Professor Berman typically refers to the Law Merchant in his book as the Mercantile
Law. See BERMAN, supra note 1, at 333.
34. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
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The preface to Johannes Nider's work On the Contracts of Merchants
bears out Professor Berman's comments. The purpose of his work,
according to Friar Nider, an "expert physician[] of souls," is to "separate
what is just from what is unjust" in the dealings of merchants, such that
rules can be determined "according to which it can be seen in some way or
other when merchants may be more or less secure in their" commercial
activity. 6 As the editor of the English translation of On the Contracts of
Merchants rightly notes, Nider's "references to that which is 'just'. . . should
be read as intended primarily to remind the reader that worldly action
should be judged by churchly standards of morality."" Such a work as
Nider's would have been respected in a time when the prevailing "social
theory" was dominated by the Christian worldview, as was clearly the case
in the Middle Ages. The preceding quote by Professor Berman
demonstrates this to be the case. "The merchants did not always agree" that
the Law Merchant should reflect the canon law, but they did agree "that the
salvation of their souls depended on the conformity of their practices to a
system of law based on the will of God."" Further, there was no doubt that,
during the time of the formation of the Western legal tradition, the law was
viewed as a "bridge" or "guide" for the "salvation of the soul."39
The dilemma for the merchant, and the theologian or jurist, concerned
with such things prior to, and at the beginning of, the Papal Revolution was
that the church's teachings on commercial activity prior to that time were
decidedly negative. The church generally answered the question "can a
merchant please God" with a resounding "no."4 0 Many modern
commentators assume, correctly in part, that the teachings of the church
prior to the Papal Revolution were almost entirely opposed to merchants
and commercial activity. Professor Berman asserts that the church, prior to
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, had evinced a universally hostile attitude

36. JOHANNES NIDER, ON THE CONTRACTS OF MERCHANTS xi (Robert B. Sherman, ed.,
Charles H. Reeves, trans., 1966) (circa 1430, 1468). In the introduction to ON THE
CONTRACTS OF MERCHANTS, the editor writes "that Friar Nider's primary purpose for writing
De ContractibusMercatorum was to provide a moral guide to those" engaged in commercial
activity. The guide was written "in terms of the author's understanding of the accepted views
of the Roman Catholic Church of Western Europe." Id. at viii. ON THE CONTRACTS OF
MERCHANTS is discussed in more detail herein as an example of the work of later Scholastics
demonstrating their transformation of church doctrine regarding commercial activity.
37. Id. at viii.
38. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 339.
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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toward merchants and commercial activity.4' He quotes "the great French
social and economic historian Henri Pirenne" as remarking that "'the
attitude of the Church . . . towards commerce [was] not merely passive but

actively hostile.'" 42 Further, Professor Berman describes the church's
teachings prior to the Papal Revolution as "fundamentally opposed to the
profit motive"4 ' and describes the church's view of commercial activity in
general as "'a danger to salvation.'""
Further, Professor Gerber has described "the church's tradition [as] filled
with antipathy to commerce."45 He states that "[f]rom its inception, church
tradition had painted an overwhelmingly negative picture of commercial
activity."" Speaking of the church's "intellectual encounter with the
market" in the high middle ages, he writes:
The patristic writings that were the primary sources of authority
for the church's intellectual encounter with the market were
replete with denunciations of mercantile activity. Heavily
influenced by Greek, especially Platonic, philosophy, these works
considered commercial activity incompatible with religious
salvation. A merchant could not follow the church's precepts, it
was thought, because commerce required lying, deception,
exploitation and other sins. Moreover, the market was seen as a
threat to the Christian community, because it undermined the
ideas of fairness and cohesion on which that community was
based. Early medieval writers who were used as authorities
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries typically either
repeated the condemnations found in patristic writings or paid
47
little heed to commercial activity.
In a footnote, Professor Gerber elaborates on the hostility patristic writers
held toward commercial activity by asserting that "[t] he only patristic writer

41. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 336-39.
42. Id. at 336 (quoting HENRI PIRENNE, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 48-49 (1937)).

43. Id.
44. Id. at 339.

45. David J. Gerber, Prometheus Born: The High Middle Ages and the Relationship
Between Law and Economic Conduct, 38 ST. LouIS U. L.J. 673, 696 (1994).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 697 (footnotes omitted).
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of importance during the medieval period who placed any significant
emphasis on justifying commercial activity was Augustine.""
Cited as authority by Professor Gerber, Dr. John W. Baldwin, Professor
Emeritus of History at Johns Hopkins University, wrote in The Medieval
Merchant Before the Bar of the Canon Law that:
The Graeco-Roman civilization of the ancient Church Fathers
nourished general misgivings about the respectability of business
and merchants. A cursory sampling of the obviously prominent
spokesman of Greek and Roman philosophy, such as Plato,
Aristotle, and Cicero, shows attitudes less than complimentary to
the practical functions of the tradesman. In their own way the
Church Fathers also shared in this general feeling of suspicion
toward the world of commerce. The Greek Basil the Great and
the Latin Jerome made bitter impassioned attacks against the
accumulation of great riches. This general feeling was
accompanied with specific criticisms against the merchant.
Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, for example, condemned merchants
for monopolistic and speculative practices that manipulated
markets and robbed the public. Many of the Fathers felt that
mercantile activity could hardly be kept clean of the taint of
greed or cupiditas. In a well-known passage Tertullian
condemned the profits of trading in a syllogism based on the
factor of greed, "Is trading fit for the service of God?" he asked.
"Certainly," was the reply, "if greed is eliminated, which is the
cause of gain. But if gain is eliminated, there is no longer the
need of trading." Finally the fathers were generally convinced
that essentially immoral means were necessary for the merchant
to succeed, that the trader must lie, cheat, deceive, and commit
all manner of fraud to sell his wares."
Dr. Baldwin continues by noting that Pope Leo the Great saw "buying and
selling [as] morally dangerous" activities and that "those undergoing
penance [should] avoid such affairs because it is difficult to buy and sell

48. Id. at 697 n.113 (citing John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Merchant before the Bar of
Canon Law, 44 PAPERS OF THE MICHIGAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ARTS AND LETTERS 287, 290
(1959)).

49. John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Merchant before the Bar of Canon Law, 44 PAPERS
OF THE MICHIGAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ARTS AND LETTERS 287, 289 (1959) (footnotes

omitted).
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without committing sin."" After noting that Cassiodorus in the sixth
century often made similarly anti-commercial comments, he concludes that
"[o]n the whole, therefore, the Church fathers considered the merchant as
persona non grata, and in this attitude they were merely children of their
times.""
While this anti-commercial, anti-mercantile teaching undoubtedly
predominated the medieval period prior to the Papal Revolution, the views
represented in the preceding paragraphs of the near universal nature of
these teachings among the patristics seem to overstate the case. Looking
more carefully at the patristic record reveals a more nuanced view of
commercial activity among the church fathers, as hinted at by Dr. Baldwin.
The church fathers were quick to condemn greed, lying, cheating,
hording, monopolies, and other sins associated with money and
commercial activity.52 These condemnations often came in sermons or
polemic writings-like Dr. Baldwin's quote of Tertullian above-and
therefore can sometimes carry an air of hyperbole or overstatement to make
a point. Polemic or sermonic discourses often lack balance because the
speaker or writer is trying hard to make a point. Just as it is a rule of sound
hermeneutics to read any one passage in Scripture in light of the whole
counsel of scripture, it is similarly necessary to understand any one specific
sermonic or polemical writing in light of the entire corpus of the work of
the preacher or writer. Therefore, to fully understand the position of the
patristics on commercial activity, one must consider the record as a whole,
allowing for the flourishes of sermons where the balance comes only at
other times and places in the speaking or writings of the subject author.
For example, Dr. Baldwin quotes Tertullian for support that the patristics
viewed all trading as evil. However, in the quoted passage Tertullian is
primarily concerned with the avoidance of certain trades that he considers
to be subject to greed and idolatry-of which greed is a form. He does make
some harsh statements against trading, such as the one that Dr. Baldwin
quotes. On the other hand, he makes other statements that seem to allow
for a more positive view of commerce demonstrating that his position was
more nuanced. For example, after the passage that Dr. Baldwin quotes,
Tertullian immediately adds, "Grant now that there be some righteousness
in business, secure from the duty of watchfulness against covetousness and

50. Id. at 289-90.
51. Id. at 290.
52. See, e.g., JusTo L.
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mendacity."" Further on in the same work, he says, "Let none contend that,
in this way, exception may be taken to all trades." 4 Finally, in concluding,
he states that, "No art, then, no profession, no trade, which administers
either to equipping or forming idols, can be free from the title of idolatry.""
The writings of St. John Chrysostom provide another example. In a
homily on Matthew 14:13, he condemns some trades, but not all, as evil.
Speaking of the sandal-makers' trade, he says:
And the sandal-makers' trade, so long as it makes sandals, I will
not rob of the appellation of art; but when it perverts men to the
gestures of women, and causes them by their sandals to grow
wanton and delicate, we will set it amidst the things hurtful and
superfluous, and not so much as name it an art. 6
Chrysostom here does not condemn sandal-making or all trades, but rather
indicates that he is willing to count them among the arts, which would seem
to be a positive connotation. Further, his condemnation is not of the trade
itself, but an abuse of the trade-the making of sandals that lead cause men
to lust after the female wearers thereof. Again, this is a more nuanced
position that recognizes the goodness of trading and commercial activity
while also recognizing that it can be perverted to evil.
After making a much more exhaustive review of the patristic writings on
money and wealth than is possible in this work, Dr. Justo L. Gonzalez
concludes that:
With respect to economic life, Ambrose stands practically alone
in condemning trade, as he declares that God made the sea for
fishing and not for sailing long distances in search of what the
local area does not produce. Almost all other writers, however,
agree that human interchange, both in goods and in other
relationships, is part of the order created and intended by God.
Chrysostom, in contrast with Ambrose, praises God for creating
the sea so that people can travel long distances and meet each
other's material needs through trade. Lactantius declares that just
53.

A. CLEVELAND CoxE, THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, VOLUME III: LATIN CHRISTIANITY:

ITS FOUNDER, TERTULLIAN 67

(Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson & A. Cleveland Coxe

eds., 1903).
54. Id. (italics in original).
55. Id. at 68.
56.

A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN

CHURCH, FIRST SERIES, VOLUME X: SAINT CHRYSOSTOM: HOMILIES ON THE GOSPEL OF SAINT
MATTHEW

307 (Alexander Roberts, Philip Schaff & James Donaldson eds., 1888).
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as God gave antlers to the deer to defend itself, humankind has
been given each other, so that through social life, mutual
support, and trade we may defend ourselves."
This is of course nearly diametrically opposed to the positions set forth at
the beginning of this section.
The explanation for this discrepancy seems to be that the Scholastics of
the Papal Revolution had inherited a traditional teaching that did strongly
condemn commercial activity. The Scholastics, and indeed apparently many
modern scholars, assumed that this teaching was held just as firmly by the
patristics as it had been by those in the centuries of the middle ages
preceding the Papal Revolution." However, it seems more accurate to state
that the patristics held a more positive view of merchants and commercial
activity generally, but that the bombastic rhetorical flourishes of the
patristics against the dangers relative to commerce were quickly
transformed in the early middle ages into a strongly anti-commercial, antimercantile theology that dominated the thinking of the church until the
Papal Revolution.
In addition, the Greeks and the Romans tended to have a negative view
of merchants and commercial activity. Undoubtedly, this negative view did
impact many of the church fathers to varying degrees. Therefore, it is
possible that the writers in the early middle ages and the Scholastics (as well
as many modern scholars) simply overstated the influence of GraecoRomans on the early church fathers or conflated their beliefs with the beliefs
57. GONZALEZ, supra note 52, at 228.

58. For example, the Scholastics believed that a famous church father, John Chrysostom,
had written the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum. (The Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum is
an anonymous work that is discussed in much greater detail herein as the best example of the
radical anti-merchant, anti-commercial teaching that came to dominate the Middle Ages
prior to the Papal Revolution. For convenience sake, the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum is
sometimes referred to herein as simply the Opus imperfectum.) "The Scholastics falsely
attributed [the Opus imperfectum] to St[.] John Chrysostom." ODD LANGHOLM, ECONOMICS
IN THE MEDIEVAL SCHOOLS: WEALTH, EXCHANGE, VALUE, MONEY AND USURY ACCORDING TO
THE PARIS THEOLOGICAL TRADITION 1200-1350, at 102 (1992). Professor Berman presumably
follows the Scholastics in making this same mistake when he states of a quote from the Opus
imperfectum that it "was first said by St. John Chrysostom (349-407)." BERMAN, supra note 5,
at 618 n.5. Frederic W. Schlatter notes that "[tihe identity of the author of the Opus
imperfectum in Matthaeum remains a vexing problem central to a problematic text" and then
goes on to make a case for Annianus, a deacon from Celeda who lived and wrote during the
fifth century, as the author of the text. Frederic W. Schlatter, The Author of the Opus
Imperfectum in Matthaeum, 42 VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE 364-75 (1988). This paper will follow
the convention of referring to the author of the Opus imperfectum as Pseudo-Chrysostom or
simply as the author.
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of the patristics. Further, the theologians of the middle ages were heavily
influenced by Greek and Roman thought themselves, particularly the
thought of Plato, which tended to be anti-commercial in nature.s"
While, as demonstrated in the preceding, it is somewhat of an
overstatement to say that the anti-commercial teachings against which the
Scholastics of the Papal Revolution reacted were characteristic of all of
church history prior to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Professor
Berman is certainly correct that this teaching characterized much of the
medieval period immediately prior to the Papal Revolution.60 No single
source better demonstrates this hostile attitude toward merchants and
commercial activity than the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum ("The
Incomplete Work on Matthew"). The Opus imperfectum is an incomplete
and anonymous text6 ' believed by many scholars to have been originally
written in Greek sometime in the fifth or sixth century. 62 The only extant
copies of the text are in Latin.6 ' The text is best described as heterodox in
that it has been shown to have both Arian and Pelagian leanings.' Despite
its heterodoxy, it was "very influential in western Europe" throughout much
of the medieval period. 5 It was viewed as authoritative by the Scholastics of
the Papal Revolution, and it is discussed in more detail in the next section.66
59. GONZALEZ, supra note 52, at 3-17 (discussing the various views that Greek and
Roman philosophers had towards work and accumulating wealth); see also id. at 7
(discussing Plato's view of various commercial activities, how he "shared the negative view of
trade and commerce," and how he would have forbidden buying and selling on credit).
60. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 336-39.

61. See supra note 58.
62. ANGELIKI E. LAIOU, Trade, Profit, and Salvation in the Late Patristic and the
Byzantine Period, in WEALTH AND POVERTY IN EARLY CHURCH AND SOCIETY, 247 (Susan R.

Holman ed., 2008). However, at least one scholar has argued for Latin authorship. Schlatter,
The Author of the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, 364-75.
63. LAIOU, supra note 62, at 247.

64. Frederic W. Schlatter, The Pelagianism of the Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, 41
VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE 267-85 (1987). "It has been the fate of the Opus imperfectum in

Matthaeum since Erasmus reassessed it for his edition of 1530 to be classified as an Arian
work." Id. at 267. Schlatter comes to the conclusion "that the Opus imperfectum is
predominantly and basically a Pelagian work." Id. at 283.
65.

LAIOU, supra note 62, at 248.

66. The Scholastics of the Middle Ages took Justinian's Code, the Bible, and the church
fathers to be authoritative. For example, "As in the case of theology, the written text as a
whole, the Corpus Juris Civilis, like the Bible and the writings of the church fathers, was
accepted as sacred, the embodiment of reason." BERMAN, supra note 1, at 132. "Even apart
from the universities, the church had long taught that all human law was to be tested and
judged by divine law and moral law; but the university jurists added the concept of an ideal
human law, the Roman law of Justinian's books, which-together with the Bible, the writings

470

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 453

After discussing the Opus imperfectum, this article turns to how the
Scholastics dealt with this strident text. The great expansion of commercial
activity during and after the Papal Revolution placed significant stress on
the integrity of this teaching. Therefore, the Scholastics began to reinterpret
the church's teachings on this subject, which were based in large part upon
the Opus imperfectum, in a manner more favorable to merchants and
commercial activity.' This demonstrates that, by the fifteenth century, the
Scholastics had effectively reinterpreted the anti-commercial teachings of
the Opus imperfectum and some were instead teaching the goodness of just
commercial activity. The following section begins by discussing the anticommercial teachings of the Opus imperfectum as representative of the
teachings of much of the medieval church prior to the Papal Revolution.
Then, it discusses the work of two Scholastics, the influential Thomas
Aquinas and the lesser-known Johannes Nider. These works demonstrate
how over a period of centuries the Scholastics moved the doctrine of the
church from a position that commercial activity can almost never please
God to a position that just commercial activity is pleasing to God.
III. THE OPUS IMPERFECTUMINMATTHAEUM: THE CHURCH CONCLUDES
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY CAN NEVER PLEASE GOD

The Opus imperfectum answers the question "can a merchant please
God?" with a rather emphatic "no." In commenting on the cleansing of the

of the church fathers, the decrees of church councils and popes, and other sacred textsprovided basic legal principles and standards for criticizing and evaluating existing legal
rules and institutions. These inspired writings of the past, and not what any lawgiver might
say or do, provided the ultimate criteria of legality." Id. at 163. The use of the term
"reinterpret" is therefore appropriate, although it may seem a bit odd, because this is what
the Scholastics did. They did not, generally speaking, challenge the validity of the church
fathers, such as the Opus imperfectum. Rather, they took the church fathers, along with the
Bible and Justinian's Code, as authoritative sources and attempted to reconcile them where
they perceived them to be in conflict.
67. "{Tlhe Scholastics wrote 'to reconcile the new contractual relations, which sprang
from economic expansion, with the traditional morality expounded by the Church."' Daniel
A. Wren, Medieval or Modern? A Scholastic's View of Business Ethics, circa 1430, 28 JOURNAL
OF BUSINESS ETHICS 110 (2000) (quoting R. H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF

CAPITALISM 30-31 (1952)). This traditional morality, as it relates to the condemnation of
commercial activity, is illustrated in this Article primarily by the Opus imperfectum. The
Scholastics' attempts at "reconciliation" of this traditional teaching are illustrated in this
Article by the work of Thomas Aquinas and Johannes Nider.
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Temple by Jesus in Matthew 21:12,6" the author of the Opus imperfectum
makes the following oft-quoted 69 statement: "Homo mercator vix aut
numquam potest Deo placere,"'o or, "a merchant can never or almost never
please God."7 ' The full context of the quote reads as follows:
This means that a merchantcan never or almost never please God.
Therefore, no Christian should be a merchant. Or, if he wishes to
be a merchant, let him be thrown out of the church according to
the saying of the prophet, "Because I have not known bargaining
I will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." . . . He who buys and

sells cannot be free of lies and perjury: for it is necessary that one
of the merchants swear that the thing he is buying is not worth
its price, while the other swear [sic] that the thing he is selling is
worth more than the sale price. Nor is the property of the
merchants stable. It is either destroyed while the merchant is still
alive, or it is dissipated by bad heirs or it is inherited by outsiders
and enemies. Nothing that is collected evilly can come to any
good.72
Here is a sweeping statement appearing to condemn all commercial activity
by arguing that anyone who buys and sells cannot be free of the sin of lying.
Such a statement does indeed envisage an attitude "towards commerce not
merely passive but actively hostile.""
Of course, the logical question then becomes "who is a merchant?" and
therefore subject to such awesome judgment. Pseudo-Chrysostom raises,
and then answers, this question. In relevant part, he states:
He who buys a thing not so as to sell it in the same unchanged
and complete form but rather in order to work with it, he is not a
merchant, for he is selling not the thing itself but rather his own
68. "And Jesus entered the temple and drove out all those who were buying and selling
in the temple, and overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who
were selling doves." Matthew 21:12.
69. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 336, 618 n.5. The Scholastics frequently quoted and
discussed this statement. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, ST Il-II, Qu. 77, Art.
4, Obj. 1. However, as noted earlier, they wrongly attributed it to St. John Chrysostom.
70. Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum (Patrologia Gaeca, J.P. Milgne (Paris: 1857-1886),
56:839).
71. LAIOU, supra note 62, at 247 (quoting Opus imperfectum (PG 56:839)).
72. LAIou, supra note 62, at 247-48 (quoting Opus imperfectum (PG 56:839-840))
(emphasis added).
73. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 336 (quoting HENRI PIRENNE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 48-49 (Harcourt Brace 1937)).
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work: that is to say, if one sells a thing whose value lies not in the
thing itself but rather in the work he has put in it, that is not
commerce. But he who buys a thing so as to resell it complete and
unchanged and thus realize a profit, he is a merchant who was
thrown out of the Temple of the Lord. Of all merchants the most
accursed is the usurer. For, if he who buys in order to resell is a
merchant, and accursed, how much more accursed is he who
gives at interest money that he has not bought but that has been
given him by God?"
Thus, the author of Opus imperfectum argues that someone who adds value
to a thing by adding his own labor is not a merchant. The cobbler, for
example, is not a merchant for having bought the raw materials that he will
fashion into shoes and then sell. By contrast, the middleman, retailer, or
"pure" or "true" merchant who travels to one town to buy shoes from a
cobbler there for sale in another town "is a merchant who [should be]
thrown out of the Temple of the Lord" and is accursed." Consequently, the
true merchant, defined by Pseudo-Chrysostom as one who "buy[s] cheap in
order to sell dear,"" cannot please God.
However, the author's statements appear to be somewhat inconsistent.
He first states that one engaging in buying and selling cannot do so without
the sin of lying. Then, in defining who qualifies as a merchant, he asserts
that a craftsman, such as the cobbler in the previous paragraph, who adds
value by his labor to goods, is not a merchant. Certainly, the cobbler and
similar craftsman engage in buying and selling, but they are not by this fact
alone condemned as merchants because they add value to the goods with
their labor. Accordingly, the cobbler's buying and selling is permissible
because he is a craftsman and not a merchant. Pseudo-Chrysostom's
definition of "merchant" serves, to some extent, as a limit on the rigorous
teaching of this section of the Opus imperfectum by restricting it essentially
to the pure merchant. The commercial activity seen as sinful by PseudoChrysostom is retailing, serving as a middleman, importing, and like
activities that involve of necessity buying with the intention of reselling and
at a dearer price.
Still, this limitation of the Opus imperfectum's teachings on the subject
may have served as little solace to a person in Medieval Europe who most
74. LAIou, supra note 62, at 248 (quoting Opus imperfectum (PG 56:840)) (emphasis
added).
75. Id.

76. See LANGHOLM supra note 58, at 131.
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likely understands salvation as coming only through the institutional
church. Such a teaching, even given the limit supposed in the preceding,
was likely downright terrifying as it suggests the possibility that buying and
selling could result in being "thrown out of the church." Being "thrown out
of the church" would mean being separated from the means of God's grace
in this life and condemned to hell in the life to come. As noted previously,
the Opus imperfectum was "very influential in western Europe,"" and,
therefore, this undoubtedly worked to discourage commercial activity in
general and mercantile activity in particular.

IV.

THE SCHOLASTICS' REINTERPRETATION OF THE OPUS IMPERFECTUMIN
MATTHAEUM: JUST COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY ISPLEASING To GOD

During the time of the Papal Revolution and thereafter, commercial
activity experienced explosive growth." Not surprisingly, many of the
Scholastics, who were the church's theologians of the time, began to
reinterpret the teachings of the Opus imperfectum as it relates to
commercial activity.80 Thomas Aquinas's handling of the teachings of the
77. LAIOU, supra note 62, at 248.

78. A sample of related and similarly terrifying teaching is found in James Q. Whitman,
The Moral Menace of the Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence,
105 YALE L.J. 1841 (1996). Professor Whitman discusses a book, entitled SpiritualRudder of
the Merchant's Ship, written for merchants by a Dutch preacher named Godfried Udemans.
Id. at 1855. This book quotes from Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum and notes that Aquinas
said similar things. Then, it goes on to state the following:
This, and the like hard and rough manner of speaking, will easily leave the
pious merchant disturbed in his conscience and make him restless, especially
when these passages are printed alongside the words of Sirach, chap. 26, verse
27: A merchant can scarcely guard himself against doing evil, and a shopkeeper
againstsinning.
Id. at 1856 (1996) (quoting GODFRIED UDEMANS, SPIRITUAL RUDDER OF THE MERCHANT'S SHIP

3 (Dordrecht: Fransoys Boels, 1638)).
79. For example, Professor. Berman states that:
[I]n the eleventh and twelfth centuries there occurred a rapid expansion of
agricultural production and a dramatic increase in the size and number of
cities. At the same time, there emerged a new class of professional merchants,
who carried on large-scale commercial transactions both in the countryside and
in the cities.
BERMAN, supra note 1, at 333-34. Further, Professor Berman notes that this period "has been
called 'the commercial revolution.'" Id. at 335 (quoting from the title and chapter 3 of
ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 950-1350 (1972)).

80. For the response of several Scholastics to these teachings from the Opus
imperfectum, see generally, LANGHOLM, supra note 58, at 102-03, 128-33, 354-55, and 394-95.

474

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 453

Opus imperfectum in the thirteenth century is illustrative of the beginnings
of this reinterpretation of the rather rigorous teachings of the Opus
imperfectum and is discussed in the following section. That section then
discusses the work of Johannes Nider in the fifteenth century, which builds
upon the work of Aquinas and other Scholastics and concludes that the just
commercial activities of an honorable merchant are not only lawful, but
beneficial to society, and therefore, pleasing to God.
Turning first to Aquinas, he discusses in his work, Summa Theologica,
the relevant passage from the Opus imperfectum in answer to the question
"is it, in trading, lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than that what was
paid for it?" In Summa Theologica, Aquinas states:
Obj. 1. It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a
thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom'
says on Mt. 21:12, "He that buys a thing in order that he may sell
it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is cast out
of God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his
commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning"
(or "trading" according to another version).8 2 "What is trade,"
says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of retailing
at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen whom
Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the
temple except for a sin. Therefore, such like trading is sinful.
Obj. 2. Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a
higher price than their worth or to buy them for less than their
value, as shown above." Now if you sell a thing for a higher price
than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than
its value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore, this cannot
be done without sin.

81. This is a reference to the Opus imperfectum, which as noted herein, the Scholastics
attributed falsely to John Chrysostom. Id. at 102.
82. This passage is quoted by the author of Opus imperfectum but according to the
Septuagint's rendering, which Aquinas describes here as "another version." Id. at 128-29.
83. This is a reference to Summa Theologica, ST II-Il, Qu. 77, Art. 1. The idea discussed
there is often referred to as the theory or doctrine of "just price." For a brief discussion of the
theory of just price by the Scholastics, see R. H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF
CAPITALISM 40-41 (1952).
84. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ST II-II, Qu. 77, Art. 4, Obj. 1 and 2, in
SAINT THOMAs AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 195-96 (William P. Baumgarth &
Richard J.Regan eds., 1988) (internal footnotes omitted and replaced with footnotes by the
author).

2012]

CANA MERCHANT PLEASE GOD?

475

Thus, Aquinas, in discussing the Opus imperfectum, recognizes that it
teaches that the activities of the trader or pure merchant are sinful. Stating
what appears to have been the reasoning of the Opus imperfectum more
clearly than Pseudo-Chrysostom, he reasons that one is only cast out of the
Temple for sin, and Christ cast the merchants of the Temple. Therefore,
commercial activity such as that carried on by true merchants must be
sinful."
This idea seems to be based in the idea that it is a sin to do the very thing
that a true merchant does-buy cheap to sell dear. This conclusion appears
to rest upon the rather naive idea that an item's value is constant, as
between persons and locales, and therefore, in order to buy cheap and sell
dear, the merchant must either buy for less than the just price, sell for more
than the just price, or both. Thus, prior teaching, as understood by Aquinas,
would forbid as much commercial activity as sin. Given the explosive
growth of trade and commercial activity during and following the era of the
Papal Revolution, 86 one might expect Aquinas to attempt to limit or
mitigate the full reach of such teaching, which is exactly what he does.
Aquinas begins by turning to Augustine for a more balanced view of
commercial activity." He writes:
On the contrary,Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I
have not known learning," says, "The greedy tradesman
85. See NIDER, supra note 36, at 10 n.10 (quoted text in the footnote belongs to the
editor). Obviously, there are other valid interpretations of this passage that would not
involve the condemnation of commercial activity. Nevertheless, typical of scholastic
reasoning, Aquinas is more concerned with harmonizing all of the sources from tradition
than a careful exegesis of the scriptures. This is illustrated by an editor's footnote to Johannes
Nider's On the Contractsof Merchants,which points out the purpose of the Scholastics, from
which is manifestly lacking the careful exegesis of the scriptures:
Medieval theologians [i.e., Scholastics] such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas
Aquinas, and Duns Scotus were much concerned with the problem of
redefining the proper attitude of the church toward economic affairs. Broadly
speaking, the Scholastics of the Middle Ages sought to reconcile the views of
the early Church Fathers with those held by Aristotle (whose Nicomachean
Ethics summarized his ideas of "just price," etc.) and with the practical needs of
the growing business community.
Id.
86. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 336-37, 618 n.5.
87. Gerber asserts that Augustine was "[tihe only patristic writer of importance during
the medieval period who placed any significant emphasis on justifying commercial activity."
Gerber, supra note 45, at 697 n. 113 (citing John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Merchant before
the Bar of Canon Law, 44 PAPERS OF THE MICHIGAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ARTS AND LETTERS
287, 287, 290 (1959)).
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blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the
price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft,
which can be exercised without these vices." Therefore trading is
not in itself unlawful."
Augustine's view, as represented here by Aquinas, is that it is not
commercial activity itself that is the problem. Instead, it is the sin that often
accompanies commercial activity. Thus, Aquinas concludes that "the
craft ... [of] trading is not in itself unlawful.""
Aquinas continues by comparing the legitimate commercial activity of
the "housekeepers or civil servants," which is entered into "in order to
satisfy the needs of life," and the commercial activity of the "tradesman,"
88. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ST II-II, Qu. 77, Art. 4, in SAINT THOMAS
196 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting Augustine, Enarratio
70).
in Psalmum
It is disappointing that neither Aquinas, Augustine, nor Nider noted the obvious
weakness of Pseudo-Chrysostom's argument based upon Psalm 70:15 (which, in most
English Bibles, is Psalm 71:15.) Pseudo-Chrysostom's reliance upon Psalm 70:15 rests upon a
scribal error that added the questionable language frequently translated "because I have not
known bargaining [or business, or sometimes buying and selling] I will enter the Kingdom
of Heaven." The error apparently originates from a scribal error in the Greek Septuagint that
carried into some versions of the Latin Vulgate. One error added the line entirely, while
some manuscripts show an alternate reading of the line which changed the word from
learning or literature to bargaining or business. "St. Augustine knew of both versions and
was puzzled by the divergence, but failed to establish a sensible reconciliation." LANGHOLM,
supra note 58, at 128-29.
Augustine's confusion, however, may perhaps be excused by the fact that, despite his
obvious and incredible genius, he knew very little Greek. "Augustine's failure to learn Greek
was a momentous casualty of the Late Roman educational system: he will become the only
Latin philosopher in antiquity to be virtually ignorant of Greek." PETER BROWN, AUGUSTINE
OF Hippo 24 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2000). The author is not aware of the knowledge that either
Aquinas or Nider had of Greek. Accordingly, the author is tempted to be very forgiving
toward these great men given that the research for and writing of this article has rather
painfully reminded him of his own ignorance of both Latin and Greek, which has served as a
great hindrance to the work of researching and writing this article.
Finally, Aquinas's failure to focus on the Scriptural issue is probably also due to the
fact that the Scholastics tended to be more concerned with the synthesizing of ancient
sources in general than with determining the clear teaching of the Scripture in particular.
Carson and Moo, for example, in discussing Aquinas note the tendency to focus on the
philosophical over Scripture exegesis. "Despite the enormous influence his work has wielded,
especially but by no means exclusively within Catholicism, his categories belong rather more
to the domains of philosophy and systematic then to rigorous exegesis." D. A. CARSON AND
DOUGLAS Moo, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT 44 (Zondervan, 2d ed. 2005).
89. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND
AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS

POLITICS 196 (2d ed. 2002).
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which is "not on account of the necessities of life but for profit" and
satisfaction of "the greed for gain."90 Reasoning from this, Aquinas
concludes that all commercial activity in and of itself is not sinful, but,
rather, he appears instead to argue that it is neutral-neither inherently
good nor inherently sinful.
Nevertheless, gain, which is the end of trading, though not
implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not,
in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue; wherefore
nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or
even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for
instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to
acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household or for the
assistance of the needy; or, again, a man may take to trade for
some public advantage, for instance, lest his country lack the
necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment
for his labor."
Sin, or virtue, then comes from the motivation behind entering commercial
activity and the end to which any resultant gain is put. Providing for oneself
through commercial activity on the basis of one's labor is "lawful," while
commercial activity engaged in due to greed and avarice is not lawful.92
Further, relying on the author of Opus imperfectum, Aquinas noted a
distinction between selling goods at a higher price unaltered and without
their "undergoing any change" and selling goods "that [have been] changed
for the better" by the labor of the seller." The latter is a reward for the labor
of the seller and is lawful, while the former, according to Aquinas, is more
suspect in that it is more open to avarice."
In addition to merely resting on the distinction already made in the Opus
imperfectum, Aquinas goes further and attempts to justify, in certain
situations, buying at a low price and selling at a higher price.
Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he bought is a
tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If,
on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession and
afterwards, for some reason, wishes to sell, it is not a trade
transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 196-97.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id.
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either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of
the thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on
account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from
one place to another, or again in having it carried by another. In
this sense, neither buying nor selling is unjust."
Thus, Aquinas asserts that a person has not sinned merely by buying at a
low price and selling at a high price. Rather, he appears to require that the
person have not bought originally with such purpose, but he must have
6
"afterwards, for some reason" changed his mind and decided to sell."
Therefore, if not originally intending to buy low and sell high, he is
justified in selling at a higher price than he originally paid. Aquinas asserts
that this higher price may be justified for a number of reasons, including
changes in price due to change in location or the passage of time, labor
invested to alter the thing, or the costs and risks incurred in moving the
thing from one place to another. Consequently, according to Aquinas,
such a person is not a merchant or "tradesman" by virtue of his original
intent to buy the goods for "possession" as opposed to "for sale."" However,
the same reasons used to justify the higher price for the "and afterwards, for
some reason"99 seller just as readily serve to justify the higher price for the
merchant buying with the express intention of resale. Unfortunately,
Aquinas does not address this rather logical extension of his argument.
Aquinas thus softened the teaching of the Opus imperfectum in two ways.
First, he asserts that trading, i.e., commercial activity, is not evil in and of
itself. Whether it be vice or not is instead determined by the motive behind
entering into the transaction and the end to which any gain is put. Second,
he asserts that buying at a lower price and selling at a higher price is not
always unlawful. This is the case, for instance, in the situation of the
"afterwards, and for some reason" buyer-turned-seller, who buys the good
for possession, but, "afterwards, and for some reason," decides to sell it and
at a higher price than was paid. While the reasons that Aquinas gives to
justify the higher price in this situation would apply equally to true
merchants, he does not extend his logic that far. Rather, he appears to
support the idea that a merchant buying goods for the purpose of resale at a
higher price is behaving sinfully.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Aquinas reinterpreted the teachings of the Opus imperfectum to make
them more favorable to commercial activity, but he stopped short of
recognizing commercial activity as good or permitting buying with the
express purpose of reselling at a higher price. Although not taking these
next logical steps himself, Aquinas's arguments appear to have provided
some support for the work of Johannes Nider, a later scholastic who did
take these steps. Nider's work, De ContractibusMercatorum'00 or "On the
Contracts of Merchants," written in the fifteenth century, is a "guide for
conduct that would enable merchants to engage in trade while still being
assured that their practices were ethical, or 'just' in the language of the
times."' 0' Nider does not specifically address the Opus imperfectum, but he
does specifically address the issue raised by the Opus imperfectum and not
reinterpreted by Aquinas-whether a merchant may, without danger to his
soul, buy a good at a lower price with the express purpose of selling it at a
higher price.'02 The Opus imperfectum answered this question in the
negative, and Aquinas seemed to have agreed, but Nider, assuming certain
conditions such as voluntariness and a just price, reached the opposite
conclusion.'03
In Chapter III, entitled "Concerning the Rules According to Which It
Can Be Seen in What Way and When Merchants May Be More or Less
Secure," Nider states that he is discussing a merchant who "buys not in
order to use, that is, but to sell, and this for more."" Nider is therefore
clearly discussing the shoe merchant from the earlier example herein who
buys shoes in one town to sell them in another at a higher price, as opposed
to the cobbler who buys raw materials with which to make shoes and then
sells those shoes. Of this merchant, he says that:
Insofar as such a merchant is useful to the commonwealth,
Scotus approves of his existence .

.

. because it is useful to the

commonwealth to have keepers of things for sale in order that
they can be promptly found by those who need them and want to
purchase them. In particular, it is useful to the commonwealth to
have importers of necessary things in which a country does not
abound, although their availability and employment is useful and
100. NIDER, supra note 36. This is a translation of Nider's original work in Latin, De
ContractibusMercatorum, written in approximately 1430 and published in approximately
1468; see also Wren, supra note 67, at 109.
101. Wren, supra note 67, at 117.
102. Id. at 38-54.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 38.
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necessary. From this it follows that the merchant who imports a
product from a country where it abounds, into a country where it
is lacking, or who takes care of this product after it has been
imported, in order that it may readily be found by the one
desiring to buy it, performs an act useful to the
commonwealth.'
It follows then, according to Nider, that such a useful act is not sinful and
that a merchant performing such a useful act would be right to expect some
gain thereon.
After qualifying that the thing imported is "nothing of itself shameful but
rather only lawful, honorable, and useful,"10 6 Nider concludes:
When, under these circumstances, someone seeks a limited
[reasonable] gain by the practice of commerce, with the intention
of sustaining his own house or contributing toward the
subvention of the indigent, or when he engages in commerce
because of its public utility lest things necessary to the life of his
country be wanting-when, that is, he seeks gain not as an end
but as a stipend for his efforts, as it were-this is morally
legitimate in the opinion of Saint Thomas. 07
As noted previously herein, Aquinas stopped short of reaching this
conclusion. He did conclude that in limited circumstances one may buy
cheap and sell dear. Further, he concluded that motives do indeed matter, as
Nider points out. However, contrary to Nider's conclusion, Aquinas
concludes that only those persons who buy with the intent to possess and
not to sell, but then change their minds and sell, are engaged in morally
legitimate activity.' By contrast, Nider concludes that even those who
"buy[] not in order to use .. . but to sell, and this for more" are engaged in
morally legitimate activity just the same.' While this is a logical extension
of Aquinas's arguments noted in this Article, it is not one made by Aquinas
himself.
In support of this extension of Aquinas's arguments, Nider relies on
grounds very similar to the ones used by Aquinas to justify his "and
afterwards, for some reason" buyer-turned-seller. Nider states "that a
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.

109. NIDER, supra note 36, at 38-39.
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merchant of the type just described [i.e., the merchant buying in order to
sell at a higher price] can, in proportion to his diligence, prudence, and
risks, lawfully receive in exchange" a profit.no Nider continues by noting
that "it is right for everyone serving the commonwealth by honest work to
live honorably by his toil.""' Therefore, Nider concludes "whoever imports
or [maintains an inventory of] goods honorably and usefully serves the
commonwealth and, therefore, stands justified in profiting thereby."" 2
Nider, with reasons similar to those of Aquinas, justifies this profit as a
reward for the merchant's "diligence, prudence, and risks" and his costs of
importing and housing such goods."'
Thus, by the fifteenth century, Nider reached a conclusion nearly
diametrically opposed to the one reached by the author of the Opus
imperfectum. Pseudo-Chrysostom's position is that no true merchant can
honor God, and he defines a merchant as one who buys cheap and sells
dear."' Nider, on the other hand, concluded that a true merchant dealing
justly in "lawful, honorable, and useful goods," far from being "thrown out
of the Temple of the Lord," is instead useful to society and justified in
earning a reasonable profit from his commercial activities."'
Further, with only minor extrapolation, Nider's position is that the
merchant engaged in just commercial activity is pleasing to God and that
the commercial activity itself is useful to society; therefore, the merchant
and the commercial activity are good. Rather than viewing the work of the
just merchant as merely neutral as Aquinas did, Nider describes it as
"honest work," "honorabl[e]," and a useful service to society."' On the
Contracts of Merchants does not contemplate that commercial activity itself
is a danger to the merchant's soul-the danger lies in unjust commercial
110. Id. at 39. Nider develops this more fully in his discussion of the value of goods. For
example, he states that:
Such businessmen may properly charge more than their actual costs because of
the expenses, exertions, cares, qualities of industry, risks, and other reasonable
engagements or burdens which they undergo in bringing together things useful
to men or in preserving or setting out necessary things in the common market
place, and because they remain [there] in order that anyone in need may
promptly have such goods.
Id. at 30-31.
111. Id. at 39.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 30-31, 39.
114. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
116. NIDER, supra note 36, at 39.
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activity, characterized by the sins of avarice and deceit."' Rather, On the
Contracts of Merchants is written to presumably pious merchants who
desire to ply their trade honorably and in a way pleasing to God and written
with the express purpose of providing them with guidelines whereby they
may do just that."' Thus, a fair conclusion is that Nider viewed just
commercial activity as a good thing and the pious merchant engaged
therein as pleasing to God.
By contrast, the Opus imperfectum stood for the propositions that a
merchant can almost never please God and commercial activity is almost
always evil."' This represented the church's position for much of the
medieval period. However, by the fifteenth century, the Scholastics, as
demonstrated by the work of Nider, had entirely reinterpreted this teaching.
Nider, representing his understanding of the church's teachings,' 20 agrees
that an unjust merchant can never please God, but a merchant engaged in
just commercial activity is understood by Nider as pleasing to God.
Additionally, the just commercial activity of that merchant is seen as useful
to society and therefore basically good.
Thus, at least by the conclusion of the Scholastic period (and to a large
degree much earlier in the period), the Church's teachings on commercial
activity can be summarized as just commercial activity is pleasing to God.
This idea, that "the economic activities of merchants, like other secular
activities, were no longer to be considered as necessarily 'a danger to
salvation'; on the contrary, they were considered to be a path to salvation, if
carried on according to the principles laid down by the church." 2 ' These
principles-foundational among which is the idea that just commercial
activity is pleasing to God-formed the basis for the mercantile law, "a
system of law based on the will of God as manifested in reason and
conscience."' 2 2 Departing from this understanding of commercial law has

117. Id. at 38-54.

118. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
120. In the introduction to On the Contracts of Merchants, the editor writes "that Friar
Nider's primary purpose for writing De Contractibus Mercatorum was to provide a moral
guide to those" engaged in commercial activity. The guide was written "in terms of the
author's understanding of the accepted views of the Roman Catholic Church of Western
Europe." Thus, "[tihe innumerable references to that which is 'just,' or 'right,' or 'lawful,' . . .
should be read as intended primarily to remind the reader that worldly action should be
judged by churchly standards of morality." NIDER, supranote 36, at viii.
121.

BERMAN, supra note 1, at 339.

122. Id.
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necessarily led to a lack of coherence and consistency in commercial law
jurisprudence. Perhaps a return to it can restore these essential
characteristics.
V. TOWARD A LAW-OF-NATURE COMMERCIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE BASED
UPON THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLE THAT JUST COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IS
PLEASING TO GOD

In another time, when people thought much differently, Justice Story of
the United States Supreme Court could write of such a thing as "the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence" and general
"principles of commercial law."' 23 These general principles of commercial
law where thought to be the same for all people for all time in all places:
The law respecting [commercial activity] may be truly declared
in the languages of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v.
Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a
single country only, but of the commercial world. Non erit alia
lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud
24
omnes gentes, et omni tempore una eademque lex obtinebit.1
For centuries, courts in the West would reason from these general
principles of commercial law to the particular facts of a given case. The
departure from this way of thinking has greatly contributed to the current
incomprehensibility of law and the related cynicism toward and contempt
of law in the West. Given the disastrous results of this change in
jurisprudential thinking, perhaps a return to early models and ways of
thinking is in order.'25
123. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
124. Id. at 19. The quoted phrase from Cicero can be translated "nor will there be one law
in Rome, another in Athens, another now, another in the future, but one law eternal and
immutable will bind together all nations of all times." III MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE
PUBLICA 22 (James E.G. Zetzel) (1995).
125. Livy makes just such a suggestion in THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME. He writes:

I invite the reader's attention to much more serious consideration of the kind of
lives our ancestors lived, of who were the men, and what the means both in
politics and war by which Rome's power was first acquired and subsequently
expanded; I would then have him trace the process of our moral decline, to
watch, first, the sinking of the foundations of our morality as the old teaching
was allowed to lapse, then the rapidly increasing disintegration, then the final
collapse of the whole edifice, and the dark dawning of our modern day when
we can neither endure our vices nor face the remedies needed to cure them.
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Such a return should begin with the recognition that there are general
principles of commercial law that are knowable and can serve as the basis
for a jurisprudence of commercial law. Further, as the Scholastics eventually
concluded, a foundational general principle of commercial law is that just
commercial activity is a good thing.
On the first topic, i.e., that there are general principles of law that are
knowable and can serve as a basis for legal analysis, there is perhaps no
greater work than Dean Jeffrey Tuomala's magnificent article Marbury v.
Madison and the Foundation of Law.26 Of particular help for the topic at
hand is Section IV of that article, which is captioned "Marbury-The
General Principles of Law."2' In that section of his article, Dean Tuomala
asserts that "God's law not only provides the right to establish a framework
of government, but it . . . . [A]lso provides other general principles of

The study of history is the best medicine for a sick mind; for in history you
have a record of the infinite variety of human experience plainly set out for all
to see; and in that record you can find for yourself and your country both
examples and warning; fine things to take as models, base things, rotten
through and through, to avoid.
LivY, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME 30 (Aubrey de Selincourt trans., Penguin Classics 2002).
The prophet Jeremiah suggests a similar remedy for the people of Judah when he writes,
"Thus says the Lord, 'Stand by the ways and see and ask for the ancients paths, Where the
good way is, and walk in it; And you will find rest for your souls." Jeremiah 6:16. This is not a
romantic imagining that the "the good old days" were much better. Ecclesiastes 7:10. Rather,
it is an understanding that, when one's way has been lost, it is often helpful to return to the
place in the road where the wrong turn was made.
126. Jeffrey Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L.
REv. 297 (2010). Dean Tuomala does an outstanding job of describing (1) "law of nature"
jurisprudence; (2) the historic character of law of nature jurisprudence, including its
foundations in Christianity and God's law; (3) the departure from this way of thinking about
the law; and (4) the related decent into a purely positivistic understanding of law, which has
lead to the type of confusions throughout the law as are discussed particularly in this Article
as they relate to commercial law. For the most part, this Article does not attempt to set out
again all of Dean Tuomala's arguments, but rather the author commends the reader to Dean
Tuomala's excellent article for a fuller explication of these important issues. That said, this
Article generally accepts the premises and conclusions of Dean Tuomala's excellent work
without additional examination, and it attempts to move on from there by attempting to
understand and apply the "general principles of commercial law" in order to begin laying the
foundation for a law of nature jurisprudence of commercial law. Further, throughout this
Article, when a reference is made to a law-of-nature jurisprudential approach, it is intended
to refer to the approach described and set out by Dean Tuomala in this article. See, e.g., id. at
315-16 & nn.95-98 (describing a law-of-nature jurisprudence and noting that it was "set out
in the Declaration of Independence" and "is not simply a human convention").
127. Id. at 314-25.
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law."l 28 It was with these other principles of law that the Scholastics were
grappling when they reinterpreted the Opus imperfectum. These general
principles formed the foundation for law for nearly a millennia in the West.
In discussing these general principles and Chief Justice John Marshall's
view of them, Dean Tuomala writes:
He presupposed a preexisting law, whose source is identified in
the Declaration of Independence, that grounds the right to
establish a government, provides the general principles of law,
and defines the nature of judicial power.
Marshall's "general principles of law" may be identified in
part with the "general principles of commercial law" to which
Justice Story appealed in Swift v. Tyson. It is generally recognized
that Story's opinion in Swift was grounded in law-of-nature
jurisprudence. . . . Swift was based on the law-of-nature
jurisprudence set out in the Declaration of Independence, that
law is not simply a human convention. This jurisprudence
provided the basic rule of law upon which thousands of decisions
... were premised ... .129
As noted earlier, however, the legal systems in the West have abandoned
this way of understanding the law, and consequently "most contemporary
lawyers, judges, and law professors do not recognize any law superior to the
Constitution" which "means they will not recognize the existence of general
principles of law as articulated in Marbury and Swift.""o
Like Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, among many others,
they do not even believe that these principles exist. In the landmark case of
Eerie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, for example, Justice Brandeis, in overruling
Swift v. Tyson, wrote that "[t]he fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift
v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the
assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State but obligatory within it. . . . ."'

Further, in Guaranty Trust

Co. v. York, "Justice Frankfurter ... proclaimed that Erie had . . . actually
established an entirely different way of looking at the law"'32 that did not
include any higher general principles of law. Frankfurter too quoted
128.
129.
130.
131.
at 323.
132.

Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315-16 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 316.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938); see also Tuomala, supra note 126,
Tuomala, supra note 126, at 324.
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Holmes, proclaiming that law should not be "conceived as a 'brooding
omnipresence' of Reason" capable of providing general principles upon
which law can be based. 33
Without these general principles of law, most all areas of law,
commercial law included, lack any foundation other than the will of the
sovereign.13 Being Realists and positivists, Justices Brandeis and Holmes
would certainly agree, as is evidenced by Justice Brandeis's quote of Justice
Holmes in Erie, which concludes that "'[t]he authority and only authority is
the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own
(whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the
last word."" 3 As Dean Tuomala demonstrates, this led to a rejection of the
centuries-old "foundational principle of Christian common law
jurisprudence ... that human will must be exercised in accord with right or
reason to be law."' 3 6 Not surprisingly, law based purely upon the will of the
sovereign, or even law believed to be so based, appears to be arbitrary,
meaningless, and without any substantial foundation. Also not surprisingly,
it has not taken long for a strong cynicism to develop toward law and for
law to be held in contempt by much of the people of the West.' Or, to put
it another way as Professor Smith does in Law's Quandary, this shift in
understanding the law has resulted in the reduction of the modern legal
profession's "talk" about the law to little more than nonsense.'38
Accordingly, as stated at the beginning of this Article, commercial law lacks
any coherent jurisprudence and there appears to be little hope of developing
one any time soon, at least under the prevailing models of thought about
the law.
Therefore, a return to the other model of thought about the law is
warranted. Pursuant to that model of legal thought, such general principles
of law really do exist, as evidenced by Justice Story's statements in Swift v.
Tyson quoted earlier. Further, Christianity forms the basis for these general
133. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (alluding to and quoting Justice
Holmes's dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917), which stated
that "[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified"); see also Tuomala, supra note 126,
at 324.
134. Tuomala, supra note 126, at 323-25.
135. Id. at 323 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (alteration in original) (quoting Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
136. Id. at 324.
137. BERMAN, supra note 1, 40.
138. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 4, 176-77.
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principles of commercial law. As Justice Story wrote elsewhere, "[tihere
never has been a period, in which the common law did not recognize
recognise Christianity as lying at its foundations."' 39 In a similar vein, Dean
Tuomala, writing of Justice Story's opinion in Swift, states that in Swift
Justice Story
cited opinions from multiple jurisdictions and different periods
in history, not as evidence of some broader social custom, but as
evidence of what the law of God is on a particular matter of
commercial law. The Swift opinion embodies the view that law is
"permanent, uniform and universal." It does not change; it
applies to everyone equally; and it applies in every part of the
world. This was Blackstone's view of the common law, and it was
also Lord Coke's view of the common law.14 0
In an important footnote, Dean Tuomala further elucidates this
"permanent, uniform, and universal nature of the law to which Story
alluded in Swift" by setting forth the entire context, from Cicero, of the
Latin phrase quoted by Justice Story in Swift. It reads:
[L] aw in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature.
It is spread through the whole human community, unchanging
and eternal, calling people to their duty by its commands and
deterring them from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. When it
addresses a good man, its commands and prohibitions are never
in vain; but those same commands and prohibitions have no
effect on the wicked. This law cannot be countermanded, nor can
it be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded. We
cannot be exempted from this law by any decree of the Senate or
the people; nor do we need anyone else to expound or explain it.
There will not be one such law in Rome and another in Athens,
139. Joseph Story, Address Discourse Pronounced upon the Inauguration of the Author,
as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25th, 1829, in THE LEGAL MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 178 (Perry Miller ed., Cornell Univ. Press

1969) (1962) ("One of the beautiful boasts of our [United States] municipal jurisprudence is,
that Christianity is part of the Common Law, from which it seeks the sanction of its rights,
and by which it endeavours to regulate its doctrines.... There never has been a period in
which the common law did not recognise Christianity as lying at its foundations.").
140. Tuomala, supra note 126, at 318 (footnotes omitted); see also SMITH, supra note 4,
45-48 ("Blackstone and Story were, after all, heirs of a worldview that assumed that God was
real-more real than anything else, in fact, or necessarily rather than just contingently realand had created the universe according to a providential plan. This view had important
implications for the nature of law.").
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one now and another in the future, but all peoples at all time will
be embraced by a single and eternal and unchangeable law; and
there will be, as it were, one lord and master of us all-the [G]od
who is the author, proposer, and interpreter of that law. 141
The Law of God provides the general principles of commercial law. It is
only from these general principles of commercial law that one can hope to
develop a consistent and coherent commercial law jurisprudence.
It is here, then, that the church's view of commercial activity becomes so
very important. The church's historic view of commercial activity assists in
determining the Law of God with regard to commercial activity and
therefore the general principles of commercial law. Certainly, the church
can be in error with regard to a particular teaching, as it was for some time
when it concluded that commercial activity, and therefore merchants, could
not please God.'4 ' As this Article demonstrated herein, however, the
Scholastics moved the church away from this teaching, eventually
concluding that just commercial activity is pleasing to God."' This teaching
is consistent with the Bible.
The Bible assumes private property rights and a market economy."
Further, the Bible never condemns commercial activity in and of itself nor
141. Id. at 318 n.106 (quoting Cicero, The Republic, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS 68-69
(Niall Rudd trans., 1998) (emphasis added)).
142. Obviously, the author is a Protestant. Therefore, he adheres to Sola Scriptura-a
Latin phrase from the Reformation that literally means "scripture alone" and summarizes the
Reformation teaching "that Scripture alone is absolutely authoritative for doctrine and
practice, and following Scripture alone is sufficient to please God in all things." THE ESV
STUDY BIBLE 2614 (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Bibles, 2008). Popes, councils, the church fathers,
and all other mortal men may err, but the Bible is infallible and is therefore the standard by
which all things are to be judged. See, e.g., Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 1. For
more on the differences between the Roman Catholic and Protestant approaches to law, see
Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Book Review: Robert George's The Class of Orthoxies: Law, Religion, and
Morality in Crisis, 3 LIBERTY U. L.REv. 77 (2009).
143. See supra Part IV.
144. The command found in the Ten Commandments and elsewhere in the Bible not to
steal makes sense only in light of private ownership rights in property. See, e.g., Exodus 20:15
and 22:1-4, Leviticus 19:11, Deuteronomy 5:19, Proverbs 30:9, Matthew 19:18, Romans 13:9,
and Ephesians 4:28. Further, the commands against coveting the property of another imply
the same thing. See, e.g., Exodus 20:17, Deuteronomy 5:21, Matthew 5:28, Romans 7:7 and
13:9, Ephesians 5:3-5, and Colossians 3:5; see also WAYNE GRUDEM, BUSINESS FOR THE GLORY
OF GOD: THE BIBLE'S TEACHING ON THE MORAL GOODNESS OF BUSINESS 19-24 (2003)
(discussing the goodness of ownership.)
Further, there are a number of passages in the Bible that condemn financial
unfairness in the market, which of course assumes that there is such a thing as a market. See,
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does it forbid Christians from becoming merchants.' The Bible does,
however, have much to say about unjust commercial activity." For
example, it condemns unjust weights and measures,"' forbids certain types
of security interests that would be particularly harmful to the poor,'4 ' and
demands respect for debtors in the repossession of collateral that is located
in a dwelling,'49 just to name a few. Taken together, these passages establish
a foundational general principle of commercial law-that just commercial
activity is pleasing to God and is a good thing.
This foundational principle would do much to begin unifying and
organizing thought regarding commercial law. As an initial matter, it
provides a deeper meaning to the oft-stated comment that "commercial law
is merely the rules by which business people do their work."5 o Commercial
law is such a set of rules because it serves the interests of those engaged in
commerce, but that is not all that it is. Instead, it provides the necessary
legal framework to encourage just commercial activity and to discourage
and punish unjust commercial activity. As noted here, this just commercial
activity is pleasing to God and beneficial to society. Therefore, a legal
framework that encouraged such activity, while taking adequate precautions
against unjust practices, is a good thing and much more than just a
collection of rules for the benefit of merchants.
e.g., Leviticus 19:35-36, Deuteronomy 25:13-15, Proverbs 11:1, 16:11, 20:10 and 23, Micah
6:11, and Hosea 12:7. Accordingly, the Bible implicitly affirms the free market by
condemning those who act deceitfully in that market without condemning the market itself.
See also GRUDEM, supra note 144, 61-66 (discussing the goodness of competition.)
145. In addition to the passages listed in the previous footnote, there are a number of
craftsman and merchants in the New Testament who are never condemned for being
merchants and are never commanded to seek out a different way of life. See, e.g., Acts 16:1415, 40 (Lydia, who was a purple cloth merchant) and 18:2-3 (Aquila, Priscilla, and even the
Apostle Paul, who were tentmakers.); see also GRUDEM, supra note 144, 35-45 (discussing the
goodness of commercial transactions and profit).
146. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:35-36; Deuteronomy 25:13-15; Proverbs 11:1, 16:11, 20:10,
20:23; Micah 6:11; Hosea 12:7.
147. Leviticus 19:35-36; Deuteronomy 25:13-15; Proverbs 11:1, 16:11, 20:10, 20:23; Micah
6:11; Hosea 12:7.
148. See Deuteronomy 24:6 (forbidding the pledge of a handmill or upper millstone,
which would leave the debtor without a way to grind grain for bread), 24:12-13 (requiring
that a poor man's cloak, if taken in pledge, be returned to him at night so that he can sleep in
it and be warmed), Exodus 22:25-27 (same), and Deuteronomy 24:17 (forbidding the pledge
of a widow's garment).
149. Deuteronomy 24:10-11 (forbidding entrance into a debtor's house to take a pledge,
requiring instead that the creditor remain outside and wait for the debtor to bring it out).
150. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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For example, the law of secured transactions, a subset of commercial law,
still provides for pledges and security interests, just as the law in the time of
the Bible did."' Further, and still in accordance with the Law of God, it
provides special rules for the repossession of collateral.'52 Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code provides that a secured creditor may repossess
the collateral, often called self-help repossession, on the condition that this
self-help repossession can be carried out without a breach of the peace."'
Article 9, however, does not supply a definition for what constitutes a
breach of the peace."' Instead, it looks to the courts and the common law to
provide such a definition.''>
Courts have generally concluded that a central concern in evaluating
whether a breach of the peace has occurred is the risk of violence."' Further,
151. Deuteronomy 24:6 (forbidding the pledge of a handmill or upper millstone, which
would leave the debtor without a way to grind grain for bread), 24:12-13 (requiring that a
poor man's cloak, if taken in pledge, be returned to him at night so that he can sleep in it and
be warmed), Exodus 22:25-27 (same), and Deuteronomy 24:17 (forbidding the pledge of a
widow's garment); see also U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(B), 9-207 & cmt. 2, 9-313 & cmt. 2 (2001);
4 JAMES

J. WHITE

& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER

TREATISE SERIES 169 (6th ed. 2010) (identifying property that is properly "pledgeable").
152. Deuteronomy 24:6 (forbidding the pledge of a handmill or upper millstone, which
would leave the debtor without a way to grind grain for bread), 24:12-13 (requiring that a
poor man's cloak, if taken in pledge, be returned to him at night so that he can sleep in it and
be warmed), Exodus 22:25-27 (same), and Deuteronomy 24:17 (forbidding the pledge of a
widow's garment); Deuteronomy 24:10-11 (forbidding entrance into a debtor's house to take
a pledge, requiring instead that the creditor remain outside and wait for the debtor to bring it
out). It should be noted, however, that the acts referenced in these passages might be a
reference solely to the initial taking of the collateral as a pledge. Nevertheless, the principles
seem to carry forward such that if it applied to the initial taking, it appears that it would
apply with equal force to all subsequent takings. For example, if you gave the poor man's
cloak back to him at night after he failed to pay, and you come back the next day to take it
and sell it, then it would in essence be a repossession and thus covered by these principles.
153. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2001).
154. See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (2001); see also Deavers v. Standridge, 242 S.E.2d 331, 333
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that the Uniform Commercial Code does not provide a precise
definition of breach of the peace); U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3 (stating that this particular section
"does not define or explain the conduct that will constitute a breach of the peace, leaving that
matter for continuing development by the courts").
155. U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3 (2001).
156. Deavers, 242 S.E.2d at 333 (stating that a breach of the peace is usually indicated if
there is "an accompanying incitement to immediate violence"); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Ravenna, 254 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 1970) (noting that a breach of the peace is
generally found when there is an incitement to violence); Harris Truck & Trailer Sales v.
Foote, 436 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968) (noting that the "breach of the peace there
referred to must involve some violence, or at least threat of violence"); Salisbury Livestock
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courts have generally held that entering a dwelling without consent to
retrieve collateral is per se a breach of the peace.' From a law-of-nature
perspective, these two concerns within the context of breach of the peace
can be easily explained and relate to issues much more important than just
having a workable list of rules that clearly define how business people
should conduct themselves. Both derive not merely from a set of rather
arbitrary rules handed down by some particular sovereign but rather from
the profound respect for human beings as being made in the image of
God. 58
Violence is a concern because people are made in the image of God, and
therefore, violence against another human should only be carried out in
situations where there is proper authority and justification for it. Self-help
repossession, while furthering the laudable goal of encouraging just
commercial activity, does not warrant physical violence. Rather, the secured
party seeking repossession, when faced with the possibility of violence, must
desist in its efforts to repossess, and instead it must petition the court in
order to procure the assistance of the sheriff in repossessing the collateral.'
While secured creditors do not have the authority to use physical violence
Co. v. Colorado Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 474 (Wyo. 1990) (noting that one of the
main factors for determining a breach of the peace is whether there is a "potential for
immediate violence").
157. Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1006, 1007 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(noting that the "actual breaking of a lock or fastener securing property ... constitutes a
breach of the peace"); Riley State Bank of Riley v. Spillman, 750 P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1988)
(stating that "forced entry into the debtor's premises would almost certainly be considered a
breach of the peace .... [We view breaking and entering either the residence or business of
a person a serious act detrimental to any concept of orderly conduct of human affairs and a
breach of the peaceful solution to a dispute."); Berg. v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn.
1978) (stating that even "non-violent, forcible entry to retake possession of a tenant's
premises constitutes a breach of the peace"); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 151, at
442-50 (providing a detailed description of what courts have consistently found to constitute
a breach of the peace).
158. Genesis 1:26-27, Genesis 9:5-6, James 3:9.
159. Marcus v. McCullom, 394 F.3d 813, 819 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that repossession is
only lawful if no breach of the peace occurs); Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d
717, 719 (8th Cir. 19882) (affirming the principle that judicial process is required if a breach
of the peace may result from the repossession); Laurel Coal Co., 539 F. Supp. at 1006 (noting
that a creditor cannot proceed without judicial intervention if it can be done without a
breach of the peace); Wade v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 668 P.2d 183, 189 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983)
(noting that a person "proceeds at his own peril if he commit the slightest assault or other
breach of the public peace"); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 151, at 443-50
(providing numerous examples of when creditors were required to seek assistance to avoid
breaching the peace in their repossession efforts).
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to retrieve collateral because they do not "bear the sword," the civil
magistrate does have such authority." Accordingly, the concern that there
not be a breech of the peace, i.e., violence, in self-help repossession is
grounded in a profound respect for human beings as being made in the
image of God and the authority that God has entrusted to various
institutions within society.''
Further, the respect for the dwelling of a debtor is also easily explained by
reference to the general principles of commercial law. First, it should be
obvious that entering a dwelling without consent greatly increases the risk
of violence.'62 This undoubtedly helps to explain the principle that runs
throughout the common law that "a man's home is his castle."' Such a
principle is also related to the idea of biblical institutions and the proper
jurisdiction of those institutions. The institution of the family has the
proper and primary jurisdiction in the home, and this jurisdiction should
be respected by others.'"
In addition, the Bible specifically provides that a secured creditor may
not enter a dwelling house to retrieve collateral. 65 Rather, the secured party
must wait outside for the collateral to be brought out." This would have
been rather radical for the time, as it was typical in ancient times for
creditors to plunder the goods and homes of debtors taking those things to
which they took a fancy.'6' Again, this very specific rule is based upon a
160. Romans 13:4; see also Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and
Public Policy: With Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies, and Public
Policy Issues, 6 REGENT U. L.REv. 103, 116-124 (1995).
161. Genesis 1:26-27, Genesis 9:5-6, James 3:9; see also Bern, supra note 159, at 116-124.
162. Marcus, 394 F.3d at 819; Williams, 674 F.2d at 719; Laurel Coal Co., 539 F. Supp. at
1006.
163. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162
(1644) ("For a man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium [and
each man's home is his safest refuge]; for where shall a man be safe, if it be not in his
house.").
164. See Bern, supra note 160, at 119-20 & nn.84-85, 87 (establishing the jurisdictional
propositions of the family and noting that one of man's duties is to respect the jurisdiction of
his fellow man as being made in the image of God").
165. Deuteronomy 24:10-11 (forbidding entrance into a debtor's house to take a pledge,
requiring instead that the creditor remain outside and wait for the debtor to bring it out).
166. Id.
167. 5 R. J. RUSHDOONY, COMMENTARIES ON THE PENTATEUCH: DEUTERONOMY 390-91
(2008).
To protect men's houses and properties is to uphold God's order, because
God has established the legitimate boundaries of the family's jurisdiction and
freedom.
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profound respect for the individual debtor, who is also, despite his debts,
made in the image of God. It is therefore inappropriate for the secured
party to enter into the debtor's home, "his castle," to repossess the collateral.
The secured party does not have the rightful jurisdiction to so do. Instead,
the secured party must wait outside the house for the debtor to bring the
collateral out.'
Using a law-of-nature approach, this brief example demonstrates that a
coherent and consistent commercial law jurisprudence can be developed
that is intellectually satisfying. It is so because it is grounded on more than
merely the will of the sovereign, and it consists of more than merely just a
set of rules governing what business people do. Instead, it looks for its force
and validity to those general principles of law that govern all the earth and
find their ultimate source in God.

A little thinking tells us what this law prevents when obeyed. When a moneylender can enter a house to choose his collateral, he can, with a practiced eye,
inventory the contents of the house. It is then possible for him to urge the
borrower to ask for more than he can repay. By this means, he can in time seize
various valuable assets.
For its own purposes, in various countries now, inventories of a man's house
are required by the tax collector, or by the census bureau. By this means, the
state knows more than it has a legitimate right to know, and it can plan to use
that knowledge lawlessly.
Id. at 390.
168. Presumably, if the debtor refuses, the civil magistrate would have the authority to
enter the house and retrieve the collateral. The Bible is silent as to this point, but that is not
surprising. The Bible, like much ancient law, is paradigmatic in nature. 2 DOUGLAs K.

STUART, THE NEW AMERICAN COMMENTARY - EXODUS 442-45 (E. Ray Clendenen et al. eds.,

2006) (noting that "modern societies have generally opted for exhaustive law codes" but that
"[a]ncient laws did not work this way."). Dr. Stuart pointed out that
were paradigmatic, giving models of behaviors and models of
prohibitions/punishments relative to those behaviors, but they made no
attempt to be exhaustive. Ancient laws gave guiding principles, or samples,
rather than complete descriptions of all things regulated. Ancient people were
expected to be able to extrapolate from what the sampling of laws did say to the
generalbehavior the laws in their totality pointed toward.
Id. Additionally, Dr. Stuart pointed out that "God's revealed covenant law to Israel was
paradigmatic." Id.; see also Rodney D. Chrisman, The ParadigmaticNature of Biblical Law,
RODNEYCHRISMAN.COM (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.rodneychrisman.com/2010/08/11/the-

paradigmatic-nature-of-biblical-law/ (providing a more thorough discussion of the
paradigmatic nature of ancient and biblical law).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, commercial law in modern times has lacked any coherent
and consistent jurisprudential understanding. Commercial law has often
been understood as little more than a set of rules, promulgated by some
sovereign, to govern the affairs of business people and provide them a clear
framework within which to act. These rules have been, therefore, viewed as
perhaps little more than arbitrary guidelines based on an implicit
assumption that one set of rules would be just as good as any other.
This Article suggests, however, that perhaps a law-of-nature approach to
commercial law jurisprudence could provide a coherent and consistent
understanding of commercial law. To develop such an understanding, this
Article looks to the church's historic view of commercial activity. Moving
into the Medieval period, the church had developed a very negative view
toward commercial activity. This view is exemplified by the Opus
imperfectum, which declared that a merchant can never or almost never
please God.
This negative view of commercial activity largely held sway in the church
until the Papal Revolution. During this time, the Scholastics began to
reinterpret the teachings of the Opus imperfectum to bring them more into
line with the actual teachings of the Bible, finally reaching the conclusion,
just before the period of the Reformation, that just commercial activity is
pleasing to God. This conclusion can then serve as a foundational general
principle of commercial law upon which a coherent and consistent
jurisprudence of commercial law can be developed. That work is well
beyond the scope of this Article, but perhaps this Article can serve as an
initial step toward that laudable goal.

